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January 7, 2000 Ognjen Pribicevic, Councilor of the Serbian Renewal Movement's President Vuk Draskovic Cast your vote and show that you'd like to see some changes
FS: You were advisor to Milan Panic, then Vojislav Kostunica, and now Vuk Draskovic. What is the influence of advisors on our politicians? Yes. I was advisor to Panic. I have been a close friend of Kostunica and we have remained close friends even today, so that was not some sort of an official relation, but more like a bond between friends. Our minds function in a similar way. My being advisor to Mr.Draskovic is a professional relationship and I act accordingly. I could say that I have a good professional relationship with Mr.Draskovic. I must also say that on most occasions my advices are being accepted. Of course, there are those situations when we take different views of some issue and those are the cases when it's up to Mr.Draskovic, as the President of the Serbian Renewal Movement, to make a final decision as he sees fit. This is the right of the party's president, and the right of an advisor is offer his expert opinions and advices. It was a different situation with Mr.Panic. There were a lot of good situations, but also those bad ones, precisely because he wouldn't listen at times to, in my view, very important advices. I thought that our differences made us take different paths and finally part. What's been happening within the Serbian Renewal Movement recently is a process of creating a new, modern political party in terms of relationship between advisors and the party's president. Except for myself, Mr.Simic and Mr.Kovacevic also act as advisors to the President of the Renewal Movement. This party has a substantial advantage over others since expert opinions and advices given by these advisors, who have been invited earlier to work for the party, are being respected and taken into account. This trend would further develop along these lines in the future and it's something quite in accordance with what I've been repeating over and over again - knowledge is knowledge. To put it simply, in order to reach proper decisions and in a competent manner. I've often said so and I'll repeat once again that so many mistakes and wrong decisions have been made on the part of President Milosevic precisely because of sheer ignorance. It hasn't happened so because someone was in bad temper or mood, but it's a simple matter of fact that people around him and himself don't know how the things should be done. This is particularly obvious at the level of foreign policy. Disrespect for expert advices and knowledge for the last decade has resulted in such a predicament we've found ourselves in. FS: The Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) now "threatens" with noninstitutional methods of struggle against the regime so as to force it into early elections. Why has SPO taken up such methods of exerting pressure on the regime so late in comparison to the rest of the opposition bloc?
For six months we've pursued the kind of policy of street protests you've just asked about. We had a policy of institutional changes, a policy of changes through elections. From the very beginning we were opposed to these demonstrations of the Alliance for Change, which ended in an unfortunate way. These demonstrations were simply catastrophic for the whole of the opposition bloc and they resulted in the regime's scornful and mocking attitude towards the opposition on account of only 100 or 200 people turning out for the protests in the streets. We think that this was an extremely erroneous policy of the Alliance for Change, which actually came to nothing and which, in my view, is even more of a failure than it seems now. The key issue here is that we don't threaten with rallies, but we've said that we'll use all the available methods to fight the regime, and of course,, this means both institutional and noninstitutional course of action. If we make such a decision, and we want to do this in collaboration with the entire opposition bloc, then such rallies must have a clear objective: a demand to hold early elections at all levels. We want to ease the hardships of our people as soon as possible and the best way to do it is through elections. We're convinced that we'll win these early elections. FS: You sound as if it were fait accompli. What's the difference in conditions between election years '97, '96, '92 and '91 and the electoral 2000? There are a lot of differences. Firstly, Milosevic experienced an obvious and undeniable failure, and that's Kosovo. You could've seen that when a singer during the New Year's celebrations started singing about Kosovo, suddenly there was total silence and no one spoke a single word. Obviously, if the people, perhaps, couldn't have grasped the essence of what had been happening in Bosnia and Croatia, then it's now certainly quite clear that this has been a complete failure of the Milosevic's policy. Secondly, the standard of living is getting increasingly worse. Economy is not the lever to oust Milosevic from power, however, 40 deutsche marks as a monthly pay combined with other factors will bring about the collapse of Milosevic's regime. More importantly, since 1997 the opposition bloc has been in control of all the larger cities and towns in Serbia. The things have indeed drastically changed. There's no more dictatorship in the media field. You have a possibility to present to these people in Kragujevac, Nis, Kraljevo… something else apart from the RTS programming. Before 1997 this wouldn't have been possible so we could conclude that influence and clout of local and independent media is quite substantial. Also, there are new people in the opposition bloc which has made it stronger, despite some existing problems. Furthermore, the opposition agreed on several key issues: demands for early elections, necessity of Milosevic's overthrow from power and need to co-operate with Europe. Finally, if for no other reasons, then we should do it because ordinary people want changes. Perhaps they aren't satisfied with this opposition bloc, yet almost everyone wants the regime to go. We need only some wisdom on the part of the opposition to channel this discontent and win the elections. FS: Obviously, differences among the opposition parties are personal, apart from those based on distinct basic concepts. Why cannot SPO accept Dragoslav Avramovic and Zoran Djindjic? Of course, this question could be rephrased and reversed.
Dragoslav Avramovic's case is crystal clear. First, we're talking here of a man who ruined the Serbian opposition in 1996. The coalition "Zajedno" had a very good chance to win the federal elections. The overall atmosphere was also promising victory. A true coalition had been established which called itself workers' and peasant democratic coalition. This is actually a true formula for success in Serbia. This man left this opposition bloc in the lurch three days before the elections. How could you interpret such a move by Avramovic except as someone's deliberate wish to destroy the coalition? Of course, this coalition couldn't succeed. It would be quite a different story if he stayed to lead the opposition into victory. Secondly, we've witnessed to persistent attempts to impose Avramovic as the opposition leader. SPO couldn't possibly accept that for various reasons. We could only accept an equal status. On several occasions we've drawn attention to the fact that he couldn't speak in the name of the whole opposition bloc. Nevertheless, he kept doing that. This is not appropriate to the situation given his position or current political circumstances. FS: Many people from SPO have strong ties to the regime. Is it harmful for the opposition image of the Serbian Renewal Movement? You should believe me that I've no ties to the regime whatsoever. I've been within the opposition ranks for twelve years. Certainly there are people in every political party with private personal relations with the people from the regime. For my part, I've excellent relations with all the opposition representatives except, perhaps, with one opposition figure on the political scene. I cannot speak about every political figure I know. Probably, there are those people with ties to the regime, but they've no influence on decision-making and policy of the Serbian Renewal Movement. You could be absolutely sure of that. Top officials of the party is definitely opposition-minded and they're intent on changing the regime. FS: Strategy of the Renewal Movement entails organising early elections. What are the minimal set of conditions which would be acceptable to SPO?
FS: So many people have been murdered in this country and there are so many unsolved murders... No, this isn't a valid argument. These murders were frequent, but only on one side. It's quite another matter when these things start overflowing onto the other side. They've gone too far with this assassination and Serbia is so sensitive to such things. Therefore, in my view, there shouldn't be such provocations. They're panic-stricken even today as they don't know what to say. We've proved that this Mercedes lorry belongs to the secret police, there's no driver, we know how these things have happened... Yes, there have been so many murders, but this time they've gone too far. FS: Situation with Montenegro is very complex at the moment and it seems that there's no mutual wish to alleviate tensions. Many people think that this turmoil would translate into another war. Is their intention to cause panic and fear to prevent true democratic changes from taking place?
FS: HDZ (Croatian Democratic Community, the ruling party of Croatia for almost a decade) lost the parliamentary elections. Will such an outcome in the elections influence the situation in Serbia and all the countries of the former Yugoslavia? This is a great event. Almost an incredible thing. There were two dictatorships, and now only one of them remains. Now it's up to us in Serbia. We have to do something about it. It's a great thing that such a change has taken place in Croatia. It proves that changes are possible so this is an immense encouragement for all the democratic forces of Serbia. There's another important issue - it's been clearly demonstrated that the opposition agreement may function in practice. Racan and Budisa have managed to reach an agreement. Likewise, the Serbian opposition may reach an agreement on strategy and allocation of influential posts, and then no one would be allowed to give up. 1997 must not happen again. Everyone knows who didn't support whom at the time and why. No one could boycott the elections only three days beforehand or say something like: "Vuk can't win the elections so we won't support him as our candidate". As I've already said, we need some wisdom so that the opposition bloc might win the elections.
It would be extremely dangerous to say that changes would take place in Serbia of their own accord given the circumstances. No - the changes will take place only if we make additional efforts in two directions. Firstly, the opposition must reach a binding agreement, and secondly, the ordinary people must be aware that nothing could be done without them. You can't demand changes and stay at home when you're supposed to vote. You can't demand changes and yet stay at home when you should be attending the rallies. Then, what do you actually expect? FS: Both the ruling party and the opposition in Croatia have obviously been more responsible than their counterparts in Serbia. Are we in for the time of responsibility when it comes to the Serbian political scene? I believe that without responsibility we cannot possibly achieve anything. I truly believe that the opposition would take a different stance and that we could reach an agreement which would in turn secure a more responsible relationship with respect to the overall situation and ourselves. Also it's extremely important for the people to act responsibly. You can't expect from others to solve your problems. Cast your vote and show in practice that you'd like to see some changes taking place. Cast your vote so that no matter how hard they tried to rig the elections it wouldn't be enough. Or tomorrow, if someone calls on you tomorrow to stand up and fight - come out and take action. Boris Milicevic
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Firstly, SPO does not threaten anyone. One shouldn't take this statement in such a way, nor was that our intention. Our goal is actually to conquer power. This is the key issue and we could hardly wait to come to power as we think that we can do much better and much more than the Socialists have done. Current developments suggest that we'll indeed come to power quite soon. What we'd like to do is to come to power through fair elections. This is our crucial course of action and absolute priority of our policy. The regime is currently creating a situation which is indeed very difficult for us, but it is so for them as well. And this means that other, noninstitutional forms of protest are to be used to fight the regime.
Those are not personal issues. They're at the heart of the problem. The problem's in the policy of the Alliance for Change. Let's take, for instance, these protests. If it's quite obvious that something isn't working, then you should stop. Instead these demonstrations turned into utter absurdity with only some 50 people taking part in rallies. And then you come and say - let SPO take the people to the streets. Can't you see that immense energy has been wasted, which was already obvious in September, and now this has become a laughable affair. What kind of an opposition bloc is it if they manage to attract only some 200 people?
Firstly, the election system based on proportional representation. Secondly, the media. The editorial policy of the Radio Television Serbia must be changed. How could we achieve this? By applying pressure. Yet only by legal means - institutional and noninstitutional ones. I'd really love to see Milosevic turning out for the polls without the opposition. He needs legitimacy, and he can't possibly gain legitimacy without the opposition. I'd love to see whether another 1992 could repeat itself when he took part in the elections with Seselj only, and we're also well aware that this situation lasted for six months. If the opposition boycotted the elections, Milosevic would have no legitimacy for those elections. The third precondition is the control of the electoral process. Circumstances have substantially changed. We hold control of the Serbian towns and cities just like they hold the reins of power at the level of the Republic which makes them so powerful. The fourth condition is that Vuk Draskovic's would-be assassins be identified and prosecuted. We'll persist in this. Regardless of what they could be insisting on, we'll persevere until those responsible for the assassination attempt are brought to justice.
Exactly. Spreading fear to impede changes. Namely, there's a balance of weakness between Milo Djukanovic and Slobodan Milosevic. Both of them are well aware of the fact that it's extremely dangerous to play with such things. Milosevic should be cautious because of the situation in Serbia, while Djukanovic's aware of those 30% of electorate opposing the separation of Montenegro. I think that Djukanovic would keep up with this policy, for which he has full support of the Serbian Renewal Movement, of creating a reasonable ambience to sustain the changes. What does that mean? It means that he'd effect introduction of Deutschemark as the Montenegrin currency instead of dinars since he can't live under inflationary pressure created by Milosevic. Whatever he might do at the economic level, we would, nevertheless, offer our full support. At the basic political level we entirely support his policy of establishing state within state, and not separation. He has to round up things in Montenegro in order to fend off Milosevic. Milosevic was the one who chased away Kucan (currently the President of Slovenia), the Croats, the Moslems, the Macedonians and now he's about to force Montenegro into secession. What kind of logic is it if none of them is no good, while the Serbs are never wrong. I don't know what must yet happen to prove that something's been rotten from the very beginning. I really don't know what yet must happen so that everyone could understand that something's wrong from the start. Something's wrong in Belgrade, something's wrong with Milosevic.
However, I have to say that we shouldn't exaggerate things when it comes to this analogy with Serbia. Firstly, the Croat dictator died. There's no dictator in place now so this changes the whole situation. Secondly, Croatia's a Catholic country intent on integrating into Europe. What about Serbia? Serbia's a country where primitivism rules. Primitivism is actually the ruling ideology. Neither Catholicism nor the West. Neither Capitalism nor Communism. Where's Serbia heading? Towards Korea. That's because the regime's decided that Serbia should forge closer bonds with Korea. I speak only figuratively as I couldn't think of any worse. That's a big difference. Croatia is, despite everything, a Catholic country facing the West and its ties and values are more inextricably linked to the West than the Serbian ones.