February 20, 2000

Dr. Rasim Ljajic, President of the Coalition Sandzak

We've no other option

Rasim Ljajic

Rasim Ljajic was born on January 28, 1964 in Novi Pazar, where he finished elementary and high school. He graduated at the Faculty of Medicine in Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina). He's involved in politics since 1990, as one of the founders of Democratic Action Party (SDA) in Sandzak, whose vice-president he was until 1996, when he split-up with its president Sulejman Ugljanin. Afterwards, with a group of respectable Bosnians from Sandzak, he founded Sandzak Coalition, which is a member of the Alliance of Democratic Parties. Ljajic is a member of European Movement's International Relations Forum and the Work Group for the Future of Yugoslavia. He was a correspondent of several newspapers from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and had a column in Kosovar weekly in Albanian - Zeri. He is married, and has a daughter.

FS: What is the state of human rights in Sandzak at this moment?

Poor human rights record in Sandzak for the last decade is reflected in the fact that human, civil and national rights of the local, above all, Muslim population have been constantly violated. The intensity of violating human rights was changing depending on domestic and foreign political needs of the current regime. While the war was raging in Bosnia and Herzegovina, violation of human rights reached its culmination since then there were instances of physical assaults on local Muslims, kidnappings, burning down houses and shops owned by the Muslims. The repression sometimes almost verged on endangering elementary human right to life, especially in the border area of Sandzak towards Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Karadzic gave an interview to the news magazine Duga saying that one of the military objectives of the war in Bosnia was to cut off ethnic connection between "Muslimania" in Bosnia and "Muslimania" in Sandzak. Seselj stated almost at the same time that the 30km-wide area within Serbia bordering on Bosnia had to be ethnically cleansed. Precisely in this area of the municipalities Priboj and Pljevlja bordering on Bosnia there were the most serious violations of human rights, even murders of some Muslim citizens, which resulted in ethnic cleansing of more than 45 villages. Thus this border area was in effect ethnically cleansed. A sort of buffer zone was created and even today most of the population forced out of this region hasn't returned to their homes.

Later on after Dayton Peace Accord the tactics of the Serbian regime changed. Pressure was becoming more subtle. There were no direct physical forms of repression, however the pressure was being applied in economic, cultural and information field. A sort of psychological and propaganda war was being waged against the Muslim people. In our view, the objective of this campaign was to induce additional sense of insecurity and fear so as to accelerate the process of migration. UN special envoy for human rights Elizabeth Ren said that there were between 60 and 80 thousands of Muslims who had left their homes since 1990.

Today we're in the third phase of this process and there are no manifest forms of repression. The regime resorted to a different tactics. Lacking the support among the Serbian voters, the regime, which has been extremely repressive with respect to this people, now wants to regain the confidence of the Muslim community by small concessions, certain cosmetic changes in approach. However, these concessions won't turn the tide in political terms within the Muslim electorate.

FS: Coalition for Sandzak is in favour of regionalisation of Serbia not only in response to the repression. In which way might Sandzak and Serbia benefit from regionalisation?

Before saying something more specific about the possible benefits of regionalisation, I must explain the reasons lying behind this trend of centralisation. This trend has slowed down to a large extent and almost brought to a standstill democratic processes in the whole of Serbia. Besides, centralisation is excessively expensive and painfully slow.

On the other hand, the longer this trend of centralisation lasts, the more radical would become demands for decentralisation. The authorities could see this for themselves in Kosovo where the original demand to restore Albanian autonomy from 1974 gradually evolved into a consensus of all Albanian political parties according to which no less than independent Kosovo could satisfy the Albanian community there. Now you may witness to the demands in Vojvodina which according to which this region should be a republic within the federation. In Sandzak there are voices demanding full political and territorial autonomy including all the attributes of a federal unit.

The process of centralisation has generated to a large extent various political and ethnic antagonisms in some regions like Sandzak, Vojvodina and Kosovo. This is why we think that within a decentralised Serbia confrontations and antagonism, which have come to the fore now, could be largely neutralised. The authorities would get closer to the citizens. On the other hand, thus could be regained lost confidence of the citizens of other nationalities. We can't turn a blind eye to the fact that this confidence was lost for the most part. One of the reasons for this is centralisation because of which Belgrade only could change the names of populated areas, streets and squares. You can't make a single relevant decision without prior permission issued by the ministry. This is why a decentralised state could halt this trend of radicalisation to a large extent, but it would be only intensified unless the trend of centralisation is stopped.

FS: What are the reasons for the fragmentation of the Muslim political scene?

On the one hand, general climate created in Serbia and everything happening on its political scene as well as in neighbouring countries, including four wars, particularly the ones in Kosovo and in Bosnia, and on the other hand, political immaturity of Muslim politicians from Sandzak, resulted in political inactivity and stagnation, a general state of confusion typical of the whole of Serbia, but even more conspicuous at the local level.

Key division is along the line that, in our view, despite difficult position of Sandzak and Muslims in general, we have to preserve our sense of political reality and endeavour to effect changes by political and democratic means over a longer period.

Regardless of all the difficulties, we haven't succumbed to widespread nationalist euphoria. We've been trying to behave quite normally in an abnormal situation. We didn't tell people what they wanted to hear, but presented them with political facts of the moment. We openly said that the concept advocated by Sulejman Ugljanin would lead the Muslims into political abyss and that it had no future since neither was there anyone from the international community who would pledge support to such a project nor could we find political partners in Serbia who would cooperate in realising such a project of autonomy which would entail creation of a federal unit on a par with Serbia and Montenegro. Such a concept challenges the principle of inviolability of the borders between Serbia and Montenegro and it doesn't respect unique ethnic mixture of the Sandzak region - Sandzak is a mixtum compositum, where Muslims, Serbs and Montenegrins are mixed together. Whoever doesn't respect these facts also compromises such radical demands.

You can't expect that some normal political option prevails in Sandzak when, given the political climate created in Serbia, Seselj wins over a million and three hundred thousand votes. Therefore, we're confronted with a domino effect. What's been happening in Serbia for the last few years has been happening in Sandzak as well, though to a lesser extent. We'll be the first here in Sandzak to benefit from the process of normalisation in Serbia. The example of Montenegro should suffice to prove this point. In 1990 the Muslims voted for their national political parties, but in 1997 almost 95% of them voted for the civil parties in that republic since the general political climate in Montenegro changed.

FS: Ugljanin and other Muslim parties have criticised your collaboration with the Serbian opposition. What would be your comment on this?

This is a continuation of similar accusations dating from a long time ago. Almost every contact with the opposition parties was labelled as 'traitorous'. However, our starting point is that things in Sandzak won't change if the political climate in Serbia doesn't change. The essential precondition for anything is the change of the current state of affairs in Serbia. Sandzak can't exist as an isolated democratic island spared from what's going on in this country. This problem can't be solved separately since it's quite different from, say, the problem of Kosovo. The issue of Sandzak isn't in the focus of the international community. It's a lesser problem in comparison to Kosovo in territorial and geographic terms.

We have to put our cards on the table and use all our strength to effect changes in the political climate of Serbia. The precondition for the normalisation of the situation in Sandzak is the change of the current Serbian regime. We aren't making any arrangements with the Serbian opposition regarding the future status of Sandzak and local Muslims. This is absolutely not on the agenda right now.

All the parties which participated in this opposition agreement have laid aside their political platforms. At the moment they're irrelevant. If we were to discuss our separate political agendas then we wouldn't be able to reach an agreement on any point. We've actually agreed that the main obstacle in the path of our political objectives is the Milosevic's regime. Now we're preparing the ground for a normal democratic environment.

There is a number of arguments which could serve to criticise the Serbian opposition. A part of the opposition bloc was supporting Milosevic's nationalist concept from 1990 onwards. Many of the political parties haven't made their position clear regarding the wars waged by Milosevic over the course of the last decade. Some of them criticised Milosevic not because of his wars but because of his failure to achieve his objectives. Yet, what might be an alternative? The opposition isn't a potato so that we could import it from Germany, Switzerland or France. We can't wait forever for different opposition parties to emerge on the public scene. Therefore, we're trying to accomplish as much as we can with what we have right now.

This is what Serbia has to offer today on the political scene. You've got Milosevic. And you've got the opposition. Our view is that the opposition, despite everything, could overthrow the Milosevic's regime if united. We don't expect that things would all of a sudden take a turn for the better, but we'll have a western European type of democracy. It's going to be a long-term process, including a series of various cycles, and Serbia will become a normal political community. However, the major obstacle to this is the regime of Slobodan Milosevic.

FS: To what extent are the independent media and the Serbian opposition aware of the issue of Sandzak and of their nationalism?

It's an undeniable fact that nationalism in Serbia was at one moment elevated to the level of state ideology. Milosevic lured the opposition into his nationalist trap, but he managed to outmanoeuvre them in this field, on his turf. The opposition tried to raise this nationalist banner even higher, but obviously without success. The fact that we developed during a period marked by nationalist euphoria had a deep impact on the Serbian public opinion and Serbian electorate which was quite receptive to those nationalist messages for which people didn't need brains, only ears.

This black-and-white dichotomy, black-and-white messages aimed at common people, combinations of social demagogy and national romanticism, particularly used and shaped by Seselj, had considerable influence in all the elections held so far in Serbia. The opposition was trying to copy this model, but without any success.

However, as I've already said, we've no other option, or at least our choice is reduced to Milosevic and the Serbian opposition. That same opposition has been either minimising the problems existing in Sandzak or even disregarding them totally. Nevertheless, whichever government comes to power after Milosevic, it won't be able to establish such a monopoly and control over the army, police, financial institutions and media, as in the case of the Milosevic's regime. Consequently, the degree of authoritarianism will be much lower. And another very important matter. Any future government would have to cooperate with the international community, i.e., respect the rules of the political game imposed by the international community. This will be a precondition to be satisfied so that the government could gain access to not only political, but financial institutions as well, and this is finally something we would have to live on.

FS: What might be the consequences for Sandzak in the case of possible use of force on the part of the Milosevic's regime against Montenegro?

Such an intervention may entail dire consequences for Sandzak. It would suffice to take a look at the map and realise that Sandzak would become the scene of major conflicts. A part of Sandzak belongs to Serbia and the other part is in Montenegro. Presumably, all the Serbian military and police forces would move from the Serbian part of Sandzak towards the Montenegrin part of Sandzak where we've got a mixture of Montenegrin and Muslim population.

I'd like to draw your attention to the fact that the supporters of Momir Bulatovic dominate the northern part of Montenegro and southern part of Sandzak. If we add to this some historical reminiscences of the past wars in this century when the people in these parts suffered the most, then it's natural to fear the possibility of such developments. This is why we endeavour to draw attention of the representatives of the international community to this grave danger if an armed conflict were to break out between Serbia and Montenegro.

Boris Milicevic

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